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In a key exchange protocol two parties establish a secret key which is know only to them, so that they can later use it to authenticate and encrypt a communication session between them. The two parties may already have a secret key shared among them (in which case we can think of this as a key refreshing step), or they may only share a weak low-entropy password, or may not share any secret information at all (in which case they use a public-key infrastructure to authenticate each other).
Group members have been very active in the research of the theory and practice of key exchange and authentication mechanism. The main line of research tries to build a general framework for constructing and analyzing authentication protocols in realistic models of communication networks.
Group members are involved in the standardization of key exchange protocols as part of the IPSEC suite of secure Internet Protocols.
H.Krawczyk. HMQV: A High-Performance Secure Diffie-Hellman Protocol. Extended version of the paper that appeared at CRYPTO 2005, Springer LNCS 3621, pp.546-566.
Y.Dodis, R.Gennaro, J.Hastad, H.Krawczyk and T.Rabin. Randomness Extraction and Key Derivation using the CBC, Cascade and HMAC modes. CRYPTO 2004, Springer LNCS 3152, pp. 494-510.
R.Gennaro, H.Krawczyk and T.Rabin. Secure Hashed Diffie-Hellman over Non-DDH Groups. EUROCRYPT 2004.
W.Aiello, S.M.Bellovin, M.Blaze, J.Ioannidis, O.Reingold, R.Canetti and A.D.Keromytis. Just fast keying: Key agreement in a hostile internet. ACM Trans. Inf. Syst. Secur. 7(2): 242-273 (2004). Preliminary version in the ACM Conference on Computer and Communications Security 2002: 48-58.
R.Canetti and H.Krawczyk. Security Analysis of IKE's Signature-Based Key-Exchange Protocol. Extended version of the paper that appeared at CRYPTO 2002: 143-161.
R.Canetti and H.Krawczyk. Universally Composable Notions of Key Exchange and Secure Channelts. Extended version of the paper that appeared at EUROCRYPT 2002: 337-351.
R. Canetti and H. Krawczyk. Analysis of key exchange protocols and their use for Building Secure Channels. Proceedings of Eurocrypt 2001, pp.453-474, Springer LNCS 2045.
R.Canetti, C.Meadows, and P.Syverson. Environmental Requirements and Authentication Protocols. In Symposium on Requirements Engineering for Information Security, March 2001.
M.Bellare, R.Canetti and H.Krawczyk. A modular approach to the Design and Analysis of Authentication and Key Exchange Protocols. Extended version of the paper that appeared at the 1998 Symposyum on the Theory of Computing (STOC'98).
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