Mashups mix and merge content (data and code) from multiple content providers in a user’s browser, to provide high-value web applications that can rival the user experience provided by desktop applications. The existing browser security model was not designed for supporting such applications, and therefore they are typically implemented in an insecure manner. In this paper, we present a secure component model, where components are provided by different trust domains, and can interact using a communication abstraction that allows ease of specification of security policy. We have developed an implementation of this model that works for all major current browsers, and addresses challenges of communication integrity and component phishing. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first work that achieves the goal of secure mashups without any modifications to current browsers, and hence has the potential to achieve immediate and widespread adoption.
By: Frederik De Keukelaere, Sumeer Bhola, Michael Steiner, Suresh Chari, Sachiko Yoshihama
Published in: RT0742 in
LIMITED DISTRIBUTION NOTICE:
This Research Report is available. This report has been submitted for publication outside of IBM and will probably be copyrighted if accepted for publication. It has been issued as a Research Report for early dissemination of its contents. In view of the transfer of copyright to the outside publisher, its distribution outside of IBM prior to publication should be limited to peer communications and specific requests. After outside publication, requests should be filled only by reprints or legally obtained copies of the article (e.g., payment of royalties). I have read and understand this notice and am a member of the scientific community outside or inside of IBM seeking a single copy only.
Questions about this service can be mailed to email@example.com .